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Abstract.

In a previous paper we emphasised the changing national and international

accounting standards used to measure net pension liability. Beginning with the implications
of this analysis for the financing of German employer-sponsored pensions, in this paper we
focus upon the internal management of corporate pension assets and liabilities. Two issues
drive the analysis. One has to do with the emerging coalescence of interests joining corporate
management and shareholders in relation to the management of pension assets and liabilities.
The second issue has to do with the allocation of risk and uncertainty between social partners
when negotiating the financing and final value of promised retirement income. We analyse
the importance of workers’ risk aversion and the widely-held goal of stable long-term real
incomes for the management of pension assets. In the context of global financial markets, we
suggest that the institutional framework of investment decision making common to many of
Germany’s largest firms is under considerable pressure; three models of investment decision
making relevant to pension assets and liabilities are used to illustrate this point. Contrasts are
drawn with competing systems of corporate governance, noting the incorporation of pension
financing into Anglo-American corporate treasuries. Implications are drawn with respect to
the changing status of German employer-sponsored supplementary pensions in relation to
debate over the future of social security and social insurance.
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Introduction
Pension policy has been widely debated in Germany (Rurup 2000). Notwithstanding adverse
demographic and fiscal trends (Disney 2000), policy initiatives have often stalled—caught
between a commitment to comprehensive but largely unfunded social insurance and a
reluctance to introduce the tax incentives that would promote private pension provision. At
one level, the issues are entirely political and deeply embedded in domestic social affairs
having to do with the role of social insurance as a force for social cohesion. At another level,
however, these issues have enormous importance for the future of German industry in the
global economy. Inevitably, any effective proposal for encouraging the private provision of
pensions must deal with the cost to capital, recognising the existing high social costs of
labour relative to international competitors. Resolution of these economic and political
tensions has been identified by the financial community as an important test of German
political capacity in the light of globalisation (Deutsche Bank 1999, pp. 27-30).
In a previous paper, we looked closely at the imperatives driving German corporate
pension policy (Clark, Mansfield, and Tickell 2000). It was suggested that the adoption of
international accounting standards modelled on Anglo-American pension accounting rules
could have far-reaching implications for the provision of German supplementary pensions.
We noted that net pension liabilities are significant for many large German corporations in
absolute and relative terms compared to Anglo-American competitors. Net pension liabilities
also vary considerably by industry sector and firm financial indicators like total financial
liabilities and gross revenue. By virtue of this information on “unfunded” direktzusagen
(book reserve) and “under-funded” pensionskassen (mutual insurance) defined benefit
pension systems, their corporate sponsors have been put into “play” in financial markets.
Consequently, questions can be raised about the long-term viability of direktzusagen pensions
systems. Even if these systems were important for the financing of post-war economic
growth, and even if these systems were important in binding together the interests of
successive generations of firms’ workers and management, global capital markets may not
appreciate these virtues when “pricing” German firms.
Left unanalysed in the previous paper were the implications of adopting international
accounting standards for the governance of German firms. We could assert that market
imperatives will, in the end, drive through “local” corporate relationships and governance
practices towards the most efficient “global” solution. This view denies the relevance of
corporate decision-making, supposing that autonomous market agents promote efficient

corporate forms and functions (Easterbrook and Fischel 1990). If compelling as a matter of
theoretical logic, it is empirically problematic. In any event, any corporate response to
market imperatives is inevitably conditioned by inherited institutions and relationships as
well as opportunism. To think otherwise is to claim too much in the face of history and
geography (see Clark 1994 and Bebchuk and Roe 1998). On the other hand, we must take
care not to idealise inherited corporate form and function—as we suggested in relation to the
adoption of IAS 19 and FASB 87 (US GAAP), corporate management may defect from
established customs and relationships. In this paper, we explore the implications of adopting
international accounting standards for the governance of large German corporations (in
general) and their supplementary pension institutions (in particular).
To do so requires, in the first instance, a brief review of the various modes of German
corporate retirement income provision. This takes us from summary data regarding coverage
rates through to the role and status of direktzusagen and pensionskassen pension systems in
the context of German labour-management relations and collective bargaining (codetermination). Little of this material will be new to experts in the field. But it is important
to set-out the nature of inherited institutions and practices, recognising that our analysis in
latter sections of the paper takes aim at these remnants of past struggles over the balance of
power within and between firms. Not only do these institutions and practices reflect the
foundations of post war power sharing and economic growth, they are often legitimated by
reference to idealised conceptions of German society.

In our analysis of corporate

governance we introduce a set of economic imperatives and management interests that
challenge continuity with the past. Globalisation and the promise for management of stock
options geared to the market value of the firm are our “threats” to the past while inherited
institutions and practices are our "constraints" on collective decision-making.
Sustaining the paper is a series of linked arguments that cumulate to an overarching
position on the disputed tension between globalisation and localisation. To start we argue
that German employer-sponsored supplementary pensions are more important than often
acknowledged; coverage rates are comparable with the Anglo-American world and promised
benefits may be a significant component of retirement income. Further more, we suggest that
many large German firms have extensive experience with Anglo-American pension benefit
systems, providing valuable insights into the advanced management of assets and liabilities
not readily available to their workers or most other German firms. The available evidence on
behaviour seems to suggest that German co-managed pension institutions tend to satisfice

rather than maximise or optimise; unfunded or under-funded net pension liabilities are,
unfortunately, associated with management regimes that have as their primary goal consensus
given workers’ risk aversion.i Even so, this regime is under threat from German managers
concerned to enhance their long-term wealth rather than their share of corporate income.
Continuity with the past is vulnerable to defection and the interests of market agents
operating in global financial markets.
Some points about methodology should be made at the outset. In the first instance,
the paper relies upon accumulated intensive fieldwork and interviews in Germany,
continental Europe, the UK and the US. As such, points of contrast between systems of
corporate governance are built-up from knowledge of specific circumstances; compare Clark
(1998) with La Porta et al. (1998; 2000) who use broad statistical studies of countries’ legal
and financial regimes. ii Secondly, this kind of inductive methodology is as much a means of
representing the world of large German firms as it is a device for developing informed
theoretical perspectives on current trends. As much as we admire the analytical clarity of
financial theorists such as Myers (2000), it is hard to accept the argument that “the modern
financial environment is too complex and varies too much from country to country to support
ready induction of underlying principles” (p. 1006). Still, our analysis should be understood
as suggestive rather than definitive. We would be cautious of extending our analysis to
smaller closely-held German firms even if we doubt the strong claims made by Kluth and
Andersen (1999) about the distinctiveness of that domain.
Finally, rather than document our points by referencing specific interviews, the
argument progresses by successive moves of analytical complication. We begin with an
argument about the role and status of German corporate pensions and then move on to
various forms of decision making that allow for contrast and differentiation. In this sense, we
remain interested in Myers’ models of corporate organization as useful ways of
conceptualising argument even if we remain slightly puzzled by his claims of methodological
purity.

Social Insurance and Supplementary Pensions
For analysts focused on reform of social insurance, the German retirement income system is
believed to have a number of virtues. Being comprehensive in coverage with benefits
proportional to workers’ income, the social insurance system provides a level of retirement
income that is arguably equitable within and between successive generations.iii As well, the

system provides related disability, early retirement, surviving spouse and family benefits. By
comparison, many would argue that employer-sponsored supplementary pensions are
irrelevant. For instance, some suggest that any policy aimed at encouraging supplementary
pensions would not, and could not, make a significant difference to the financing of social
insurance. Older workers, the generation who dominate the expected long-term PAYG
financial burden, would not be able to accumulate sufficient assets to be able to retire with
incomes equal to the promised benefits of the PAYG system. And younger workers, who
might benefit from the enhancement of supplementary private pensions, may have to pay
twice: for the retirement costs of their parents and for contributions to their own retirement
accounts. In any event, or so the argument goes, coverage rates are low, benefits are limited,
funding is inadequate, and expected benefits risky.

Social market and private pensions
If we take this logic seriously, the priority attributed to social insurance is under-scored by
the structure of the German “social market”: the inter-related institutions of collective
welfare, finance and governance that together, according to many commentators,
differentiates Germany from the Anglo-American world. See Hutton (1995, p. 20) where he
compared various countries arguing that “the behaviour of the economy can only be
understood in terms of the whole of each country’s social and political system and where it
stands in the global order.” All this is well appreciated in the academic literature, being the
staple diet of comparative corporate governance and the idea that nation-states are
persistently “different” by virtue of their internal organization (history and geography) (see
Hopt et al. 1999). Perhaps less appreciated is the extent to which the social market is under
threat from “insiders” and the changing global economic environment. An exclusive focus
upon social insurance would seriously under-estimate the changing status of employersponsored supplementary pensions.
For analysts familiar with German economic and social policy, the social market is a
comprehensive system of interdependent and reciprocal systems of governance. Each system
of governance, like the social insurance system, relates in a concomitant manner to the other
parts of the whole system.

In combination, these systems of governance add-up to a

comprehensive and coherent web of self-sustaining institutions and practices. This structureoriented view of German society is more than the just an empirical observation; it can be
found as a theoretical argument in its most developed form in Luhmann’s (1995) treatise on

social systems. By his account, social systems are self-referential systems of governance that
together constitute the whole while regulating relationships between the constitutive
elements. If social systems are properly thought to be the products of agency (action) and
contingency (events), in the German case the social system is knitted together by reciprocal
relationships and collective deliberation. So, for instance, the role and status of collective
bargaining is at once determined by an ideal conception of the proper relationship between
management and labour in society and the need for dispute resolution relevant to the
immediate circumstances of industries and firms.iv
Echoing this logic, Reynaud (2000, 4) suggests that commitment to German social
insurance reflects the “network of various contacts and multiple forms of cooperation
between the social partners and the government.” Cooperation on this issue is believed to
sustain cooperation at other points in the system of mutually reinforcing economic, social and
political systems.

Reynaud goes further, and perhaps beyond Luhmann’s theoretical

enterprise, to suggest that social insurance has a distinctive status in German society. Any
forced change in its status, bowing to global market imperatives and the interests of private
agents, would be detrimental to the integrity of related systems of industrial and social
governance. In this model, private pensions are deemed outside the parameters of the social
market. This is despite the fact that about 45 percent of the workforce are “covered” by
supplementary schemes albeit true that coverage is biased towards public employees and
employees of large firms rather than small firms (see Queisser 1996).
Data on German supplementary pensions are difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the
available evidence suggests that these types of pensions are more important than often
believed. Koenig and van der Lende (1999, p. 5) have noted that about 32 percent of firms
offer supplementary pension benefits and, most significantly, 87 percent of firms with more
than 5,000 employees offer such benefits in their compensation packages.v Furthermore,
many large corporations have had supplementary pension systems for many years, stretching
back through the twentieth century. In terms of value, major German corporations have
developed pension systems that now contribute a significant share of retirement income. See,
for example, Table 1 comparing the value of pension benefits across industrial competitors.
Of the nine firms identified in the table, all firms sponsor plans that contribute 20 percent or
more to final retirement income. In most cases, firms bear the burden of contributions, and
even when they do not employees’ share is small. For many large firms and their employees,
private pension provision will be of greater importance if proposals designed to cap the value

of social insurance benefits effectively shift the burden of income replacement to private
institutions and individuals.vi

Social systems and the environment
Implied by the structure-oriented argument is a certain relationship between social systems
and their environments.
environments.

For Luhmann, social systems are organically related to their

Although conceived as a passive “correlate” of the social system, the

environment is nevertheless a constitutive element of the social system by virtue of its
relative complexity. Accordingly, social systems are made coherent by what is deliberately
excluded from those systems recognising that coherence requires the exclusion of anything
that would directly challenge the integrity of the whole. Hence, that which is deliberately
excluded is left unincorporated and “located” in the surrounding environment.

In this

respect, Luhmann, like many other commentators on the German scene, has suggested that
social systems are conceived, in part, in opposition to the apparent dis-order and dis-harmony
of the market economy. Various implications follow from this logic. Most importantly there
is an implied hierarchical ordering of institutions and their systems distinguishing between
those that are endogenous (for instance, social insurance) and exogenous (for instance,
private pensions). Employer-sponsored private pension arrangements may co-exist with
social insurance; exclusion is a logical ordering of significance as much as it is a process of
lexical distinction.
Even so there is a paradox in theory, and as we shall see, in practice.
Notwithstanding the claimed irrelevance of private pensions such arrangements are inevitably
governed by existing overlapping and inter-related social systems even if those systems have
as their goal the mediation of endogenously defined social relationships.

This is most

apparent when considering the governance of employer-sponsored private pension
institutions like pensionskassen. Even though these institutions are deemed irrelevant to the
core institutions of social insurance, employment law and the collective bargaining system
overlap with and dominate pensionskassen.

This point is also made by Weiss (1995).

Therein he sketches the basic principles underlying federal German law, noting the
relationship between labour law (based upon private contract law) and labour-management
relations (based upon collective rights). He suggests, in fact, that these two aspects of law are
“closely inter-related” (p. 23), just as social security law is “closely inter-related” with labour

law (p. 24) even if each system is “strictly separated” (p. 24). More specifically, social
security law is a branch of public law not private law.
As each social system selects from and responds against its environment, it evolves
over time in ways that forge a distinctive relationship to the environment. By this logic, we
can go one step further in the argument noted above: as social insurance has evolved in
relation to concomitant systems of social organization, private pensions have remained
peripheral to German retirement income provision. The implication is plain: the effect of any
new tax incentives designed to promote private pension provision will be muted because of
the continued significance of otherwise dominant inter-related social systems. This is, yet
again, another version of path dependence and institutional persistence (so important in
economic geography and comparative corporate governance).

Even so, we should not

exaggerate the significance of path dependence. Although social systems tend to exclude
incompatible institutions, or relegate them to the margins of existing institutions, this is not
surely an absolute process. Rival modes of social organization may lie dormant or function
within the shadows of existing systems of governance. Likewise, the process of selection
within and without social systems is surely a contested political process. Social agents may
call upon excluded or marginal modes of social organization as weapons in attempts to redefine their relationships to social systems.
For theorists of social systems, evolution is thought of as a process of selection and
adaptation

in relation to changing circumstances (Luhmann 1995, 433).

Systems

immediately affected pass-on their response to change to other inter-related systems, being a
cumulative process of incremental accommodation even if the end result may be less
predictable than the immediate effects of changing circumstances. If this appears to be a
rather benign process, it is because it presumes the continued integrity of the whole. But
there are reasons to suppose that recent changes in the environment of German social systems
are neither incremental nor benign in effect. Three points can be made summarising this
claim.
First, the environment in which German social systems and social agents operate has
begun to change scale, a process described by Swyngedouw (2000) as “re-scaling of the
economy”. While the nation-state remains important for most firms and the social partners,
the international economic environment has become more important than ever introducing
new imperatives and circumstances not previously encountered or incorporated into post-war
German social structure. At the same time as economic up-scaling has come to be important,

down-scaling in terms of the effective unit of response (from industry to firm, and from social
partners to management) to these imperatives has become important. Collective institutions,
the bedrock of German co-determination, may be “at risk” in this new order.
Second, both large German firms’ management and nation-state elites have an interest
in responding to these imperatives.

The former are engaged in competition for global

position while the latter have claimed the opportunity to provide economic and political
leadership in Europe and beyond. Both have an interest in creating national champions,
competitive in the global economy.

Whereas Luhmann and others suppose that social

systems evolve by balancing interests and by reflexive responses to changes in inter-related
systems, these types of responses may be too slow relative to the speed of globalisation or too
cumbersome in the light of changed priorities. In play is the historical pattern of inter-related
social systems in the light of claims about what is now relevant for the global rather than the
national environment.
Third, whereas institutions and practices like employer-sponsored pensions were once
considered peripheral to core social systems and were relegated to a marginal status, as
globalisation accelerates these institutions may be especially important even if their integrity
is threatened by the imperatives driving global finance. In effect, and notwithstanding the
particular formation of German financial institutions with German social systems, AngloAmerican financial practices now threaten to under-mine both German banking practices and
the coherence of inherited relationships between the systems of finance, labour and
retirement income provision.

German Corporate Structure and Governance
To comprehend the significance of the social market for corporate pension policy, and factorin the implications of large firm strategy in the context of globalisation, requires a series of
analytical moves designed to elucidate the structure and logic of decision making. In this
section we begin with an idealised model of German corporate structure relevant to inherited
systems of decision making. In subsequent sections, we introduce global complications in
order to show the inter-action between re-scaling and corporate pension management and
investment decision-making. Here we begin by setting-out general assumptions about the
role and status of intentional and rationality. It should be apparent that we do not accept the
assumption made in much of the finance literature that economic and social agents are so
profoundly rational that the existence of rational expectations obviates the need for an

analysis of the process of decision making. On the other hand, we would also assert that
decision making is an ordered process; “irrationality” is less the issue than the structure of
decision-making (see Clark 2000 for a worked-through set of examples relevant to the AngloAmerican world of pension fund investment decision making).

Behavioural assumptions
Economic theory is largely silent on the related issues of consciousness and intention
(Biccieri 1993). For some theorists, it is enough to assume people naturally are utility
maximisers. By this one assumption complex matters of deliberation and planning are
resolved at a stroke of the pen. It does not matter how people assess their options and it does
not matter what their plans are in relation to their options; what matters is the application of
the golden rule to different circumstances. If some people deviate from the best path of
action, it is assumed that market imperatives provide sufficient discipline to limit systematic
departures from this logic (if not practice). Those who are systematically “irrational” could
not and would not survive (economically speaking). Amendments can be made to this logic
that seem to recognise the world as we know it even if nothing really changes in the
underlying theoretical edifice.

For example, it could be noted that people rarely have

sufficient information to act in an entirely error-free manner, and it could be noted that there
are limits to the value of processing information. A variety of arguments can be made about
the costs and benefits of approximation and the virtues of learning-by-doing.
This characterisation is, admittedly, crude. It focuses upon conventional theorising at
the expense of attempts to re-make economic decision making with a psychological core
(Camerer and Weber 1992). Even so, in much of the literature a binary distinction is made
between rational (good) behaviour and non-rational or irrational (bad) behaviour. For those
with a clear, uncluttered conception of rationality the concept is thought to refer to action that
has an unequivocal connection between means and ends. By definition, to be rational means
choosing the best means to achieve the most desired end. On the face of it, the value of this
kind of proposition may be judged empirically: we could set a test of the veracity of the
proposition. But this is less important here than the fact that binary models of rationality are
universal in their application; it does not matter if economic agents are American, British or
German—the logic applies or should apply if institutions are sufficiently benign (as they
should be).

In this paper we take three steps away from this conventional logic. In terms relevant
to the German context we assume the following conditions. (1) Desired goals often depend
upon the context in which actions are contemplated; (2) available means to ends are, more
often than not, also affected by context, and; (3) there may be good reasons for acting
consistently within a given context just as there may be reasons for defecting from the norms
that define that context.vii

Economic agents as stakeholders
Much of economic theory is focused upon economic agents with thin social roles. That is,
economic agents are individuals with utility functions that happen to occupy certain positions
and spaces in institutions and society. So, for example, individuals may be workers, or
managers, creditors or shareholders each with their own goals and objectives. It is also
tempting to suppose that each type of economic agent has a set of common goals and
objectives being, in effect, more similar within the type than between types once we suppress
details of individual interests. While we can begin with individuals in their own right, the
next move would be to show how and why they may be summed together under distinct
headings (like worker etc.). See Baird and Picker (1991), for example, where they use a
Creditor and a Manager to represent competing corporate interests. Of course, the process of
summing-up to a “representative” agent involves arguments about the nature and scope of cooperation and collective action, topics that dominate the literature on bargaining and
negotiation; witness the significance attributed to game theory (see Binmore and Dasgupta
1987 on Nash bargaining).
We also use the analytical device of the representative agent: introducing workers,
managers, and shareholders. And we introduce a related agent called banker to help the
analysis along. But we do so recognising that these categories have particular German
significance, the product of deliberate attempts to regulate firms’ labour-management
relations (O’Sullivan 1998). To explain, recall that the standard theoretical move is to sumup individuals into categories and attribute to that category actions and interests that represent
their type of person. In our case, however, we should recognise that a worker is a person
with social roles nested in a hierarchy of inter-related social institutions. Each worker (for
example) is an employee of a firm, and is represented by his/her union on the firm’s Works
Council. Each worker is a member of a union, itself affiliated with its parent industry union
and the national union organisation, and; each firm and its local union are represented on the

regional industry council where much of the bargaining over wages and benefits takes place.
From the firm through to industry associations, workers and managers sit side-by-side in
elected or nominated roles as representatives of their respective constituencies.viii
Joint representation is a common feature of German industrial life though often
dependent upon firm size, its industry affiliation and co-determination status.

Joint

representation does not necessarily translate into common interests or ready agreement over
corporate strategy. Nevertheless, we do assume that managers and workers share one basic
goal: (4) an over-riding interest in the anticipated growth in the real value of their lifetime
earnings. This may be portrayed as a zero-sum game, where workers’ share of corporate
income is equal to (1-managers’ share).

More likely, however, workers and managers

collude to minimise shareholders’ share of income (dividends). Our opinion on this matter is
developed in more detail below. We should also note, of course, that the expected growth of
lifetime earnings is the product of at least the following: continuity of employment, growth in
corporate market share, and higher rates of productivity. Sustaining these conditions requires
the cooperation of workers and managers. But this does not mean that workers and managers
need agree on the strategies for attaining these conditions.

Corporate governance and control
It is inevitable that we also consider the relationship between shareholders and managers, the
classic principal-agent problem that figures so importantly in the Anglo-American literature
(Demsetz 1983). We assume, as most theorists of the modern corporation assume, (5)
managers have considerable discretion—the power to initiate corporate strategy including
investment in plant and equipment subject to periodic review by shareholders. In the AngloAmerican world, corporate management has considerable room to manoeuvre because of the
dispersed nature of share ownership. Not only is it difficult to monitor manager actions,
imposing discipline is quite problematic. While it can be contended that Anglo-American
managers are vulnerable to their firm’s share-price volatility, few managers are ever actually
held accountable except in the most extreme circumstances (Bliss and Flannery 2000).
Amongst large German firms, of course, share ownership is often quite concentrated and
dominated by firms and financial institutions that hold one-another’s stock (cross-holdings).
This has been widely documented, and is an aspect of German corporate structure that draws
the bulk of commentary from inside and outside of Germany.ix

Whereas considerable academic attention has focused upon the supervisory boards of
large German firms, firms’ management boards are often closer to corporate decisionmaking, the control of resources, and the distribution of income between various internal
stakeholders. In fact, in many cases there is a presumption in favour of the management
board as the operating core of firms. By contrast, the supervisory board should be thought
(for the moment, at least) to be an institution of appointment and review rather than of policy
initiation. Just as management boards tend to represent internal stakeholders so too do the
management boards of corporate-sponsored and jointly-managed pensionskassen.

The

structure of governance of these institutions is much like Dutch industry pension funds and
many continental corporate pension funds (Bennett and Clark 2000). Boards of management
overlap with one-another relying upon agreement at one site (the firm’s management board)
to manage pension benefits at other sites (including the corporate pension fund board of
management). By contrast, direktzusagen pension arrangements tend to be ensconced within
corporate treasuries closely controlled by management.
It is widely believed that insider knowledge is a by-product of shareholder
dominance, and that it provides participating institutions an advantage over market agents
located in global financial markets. We do not dispute this argument directly (empirically).
But we do want to suggest that dominance without an exit option is less valuable than is often
assumed. For a number of our respondents, the cross-holdings of stocks between related
firms and institutions actually limits the power of supervisory boards. There is a strong albeit
implicit culture of mutual respect and mutual disengagement with respect to one-another’s
interests.

As a consequence, and notwithstanding the potential power of such boards,

supervisory boards are often of secondary functional importance to management boards.
Even setting shareholder dividends is highly constrained (see Andre 1998, and Roe 1998).
Here our assumption is that (6) large firms’ management boards, being the representatives of
the interests of internal stakeholders, tend to dominate their supervisory boards, the
representatives of external shareholders. Management power is firmly entrenched and rarely
directly challenged by supervisory boards.x
These six assumptions, and variations on these assumptions, are important in our
analysis of corporate pension policy. Whether they are entirely true across all German
industry is less important, at this juncture, than the value of such assumed divisions of
interests for the models that guide our understanding.

Global Learning and Local Strategy
Many DAX 30 firms operate throughout continental Europe, the UK and North America. Of
course, the geographical scope and intensity of external operations varies between firms and
industries. By virtue of their merger with Chrysler, Daimler Benz is now deeply immersed in
the North American auto market compared, for example, with BMW notwithstanding their
own US operations. There is, for many of these firms, a tension between the management of
their German operations and their international operations. Simply, the issue is the extent to
which management practices within the firm different jurisdictions ought to be resolved in
favour of common company-wide practice. For the most part, this issue has been resolved in
favour of local practice because management has been required to respect local customs and
regulations pertaining to employment and labour relations practices. So, for instance, Gertler
(2000) has shown that the application of common production technologies within German
manufacturing firms across the world has almost always led to local solutions rather than the
application of company-wide standards; the local environment is an important mediating
variable.
For German firms, of course, there is a further complication. Not only are many
aspects of management practice caught-up within the fabric of inter-related systems of
economic and social regulation, those systems are defined, in the first instance, by reference
to the German environment rather than other countries’ environments or the global
environment at large. In fact, many would contend that other countries' environments are not
simply at a distance from the German environment but are irrelevant to German social
systems. This is surely the argument deployed by those concerned to protect the integrity of
the German social market. There are significant barriers to the use of experience in Germany
from outside Germany. xi Even so, for German firms operating in the Anglo-American world
the 1990s brought home important lessons regarding the management of employer-sponsored
pensions. These lessons were drawn from their own experience, the experience of other
German firms, and the experience of their competitors. Here, we focus on three aspects of
this experience.
In Table 2, summary data are presented on the numbers and types of pension and
retirement income benefit plans operated by leading German firms in the US during 1997 and
1999. This data was accessed through corporate reports to the US Department of Labour
(DoL) concerning the funding and investment status of those plans (Form 5500).xii Notice
these plans were almost always fully funded as required by statute, US GAAP and the

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (Clark, Mansfield and Tickell 2000). Here,
we make three important observations. First, many of the large German firms operating in
the US have had extensive experience in the full range of pension and retirement benefits
including defined benefit plans, 401(K) defined contribution plans, profit sharing, savings
and flexible benefit plans. Second, many German manufacturing firms provided benefit
plans in union and non-union environments, thereby having to manage trustee boards with
and without employee representatives. Third, even firms with relatively small US operations
have had considerable experience with the financial services industry that underpins the US
private pension and retirement benefit system (Clark 2000).
Of course, some German firms may have had less direct experience with these types
of benefit systems than implied by Table 2. Mergers and acquisitions between German and
US firms have not always lead to mutual understanding. But consider, in brief, the (1997)
experience of Bayer (Table 3). One of their plans (003) was a DB plan funded by employer
contributions on behalf of 336 active workers and about 118 retirees represented by the
United Paperworkers Union. During the year, the net rate of return on a base asset market
value of $6 million was approximately 31 percent. Another plan, a 401(K) plan (019) with
more than 18 thousand active participants and about 12 thousand retirees was funded by
employer contributions ($35 million). Over the year, the net return on an asset base of about
$1.6 billion was approximately 19 percent. In this brief comparison is an important story
about the evolution of US retirement benefits from DB plans for union members to DC plans
for non-union participants. Also embedded in this comparison is a complicated story about
who bears the risks of pension liability, the shift towards employee contributions, and the
integrity of the investment management process in the context of an accelerating equity
boom. We do not wish to belabour these points made so often and in detail elsewhere
(Mitchell 1998). Our point is just the recognition of common experience amongst large
German firms in the US.
To take this point further, recall that we showed in the previous paper that the (1998)
reported expected rate of return on pension assets for US S&P500 companies was 9.19
percent up from 9.08 percent in 1994. Also recall that a significant number of these firms
reported expected rates of return between 9.5 and 10.5 percent. By comparison, our research
based upon annual reports for DAX 30 German firms for the same year indicated that the
reported expected rate of return on pension assets ranged from 5.5 to 9.7 percent, with most
around the 7.0 percent mark. Unfortunately, this data was sparse and of limited quality.

More detailed were data on the reported discount rate, ranging between 5.5 and 6.5 percent.
In effect, German firms expected significantly lower rates of return on their unfunded or
under-funded German plans compared to the expected rates of return on their funded US
plans. Now, of course, the German situation is quite different than the US situation; for
instance, in Germany there are significant quantitative limits on asset allocations by asset
classes, biased in favour of bonds against equities (national and international). This has been
the subject of considerable debate in Germany and within the European Commission (see
NIESR 1997 and De Ryck 1999).
But most important has been the realisation amongst German firms that their AngloAmerican rivals have developed much more aggressive investment strategies. Many US
firms have managed investment of their DB pension fund assets so as to decrease their
contributions and, in some cases, contribute to their net reported corporate income. This
point was made in the previous paper using data from a report by BearStearns (McConnell et
al. 1999), and has been subsequently validated by other reports for 1999 by industry analysts
(see Towers Perrin 2000 Watson Wyatt 2000) and interviews with UK and US firms.xiii This
kind of investment strategy can be characterized as a maximization strategy, using the most
advanced financial methods to drive rates of return in a manner consistent with corporate
financial objectives. It stands in contrast to the objectives commonly attributed to pension
fund management; optimising the value of current assets against expected liabilities (Logue
and Rader 1998).

Whether German firms operating in the US have developed similar

investment strategies is unclear.

Given the free-flow of information within the US

investment management community, it is very unlikely that corporate management were
unaware of these developments.
In Germany, however, pension investment practice is deeply embedded in the
institutions of co-determination. Consensus or collective deliberation and agreement drives
the investment management process. By necessity, this process reflects a wide variety of
interests and objectives shared or not shared between the representatives of corporate
stakeholders. By default, satisficing dominates the setting of objectives and the nature of
decision-making (see below).
Management Motives and Corporate Governance
In the preceding section, we showed that over the 1990s large German firms accumulated
Anglo-American experience and/or knowledge at odds with German customs and

conventions. Information was acquired either directly through their overseas affiliates or
through analysis of the actions and behaviour of competitors. And if none of these channels
worked, their actuarial and investment consultants were more than willing to fill-in the gaps.
We have intimated, however, that notwithstanding acquisition of this information, domestic
German pension management and investment practices hardly changed. Such is, or was, the
power of the institutions under-pinning the social market.

Yet this analysis tends to

exaggerate the power of the social market; it leaves unexplained the introduction and ready
adoption by large German firm of international accounting standards affecting the reporting
of corporate financial circumstances with significant implications for employer-sponsored
pension benefits.
We suggest in this section that management of large German firms have learnt
another important lesson from the Anglo-American world, a lesson that has profound
implications for the coherence of the social market and the status of employer-sponsored
pension plans.

During the 1990s German management, unlike many of their Anglo-

American colleagues, were excluded from the benefits associated with the run-up in global
equity markets.xiv Compensation remained tied to corporate income, denying the relevance
of corporate market value. Whereas significant numbers of senior and middle managers in
large US firms became wealthy by virtue of their stock options, German managers have been
locked-into compensation agreements that balance their traditional interests in income growth
with those of workers and shareholders. If, in the early 1990s, stock-options appeared less
significant compared to conventional forms of remuneration, by the end of the decade a
significant segment of US managers had shifted their aspirations from income growth to
wealth creation through company stock market value.xv
These kinds of compensation plans are important in the emerging information and
technology sectors concentrated in Silicon Valley (California) and Rt 128/495 Boston
(Massachusetts). For many incipient firms and partnerships stock options have had three
advantages, shared between the principals of these start-up firms and their employees. Most
obviously, stock options are a form of deferred income, allowing low rates of pay to co-exist
with the promise of future wealth. For younger workers, especially those with skills and
education in demand in the local region, stock options have been used as a reward for
commitment. For new ventures, stock options have been an effective mechanism tying
younger employees to the firm and its performance over the longer-term with the promise of
an initial public offering (IPO), stock-splits and the like. For many ventures, stock options

have come to replace incentive pay, over-time pay, and pension and related benefit schemes.
And yet, like pension benefits, firms rely upon vesting rules and related devices to manage
the accumulated value of stock options for individual employees. For the strongest advocates
of this form of compensation, stock options have fuelled the transformation of the US
economy (2000).xvi
At the same time, stock options have also become very important for large US
corporations. Whereas this compensation method was introduced to align the interests of
senior corporate officers with their principal shareholders, employee stock options have come
to be important in many large S&P 500 corporations (Laing and Sharpe 1999). In theory, the
alignment of interests between senior officers and shareholders is believed to be a better
mechanism for driving the growth of corporate market value than conventional compensation
packages. Moreover, it is widely believed that stock options encourage risk-taking among
senior management otherwise cautious about the consequences of corporate restructuring for
their own careers and income. In effect, stock options would redefine the natural partners in
any corporate enterprise—from management and labour to management and shareholders.
Even if corporate management may not have an interest in the welfare of their stockholders,
they also have a profound interest in the "cash-out" value of the firm.
A variety of reasons can be invoked to explain the diffusion of this compensation
device down through the corporate hierarchy. Through the 1990s, it became apparent that if
corporate management were to remake the US corporation through mergers and acquisitions
and the like they would have to buy the loyalty of their immediate functionaries. For a variety
of reasons, and the reasons are many and complex, as dividend yields have declined it has
become more important to manage corporate market value through year-to-year income flow
than income flow in its own right.xvii Furthermore, it is apparent that the cost accounting of
stock options is less than ideal. FASB was not able to introduce reporting rules entirely
consistent with the interests of financial markets in properly pricing the true cost of such
options. Debate over initial proposals spilled-over into Congress, and through a coalition of
“new technology” and “old economy” firms a compromise agreement was forced through on
reporting the current value of stock options. Consequently, stock options may be thought to
be a partially accounted transfer of wealth to participating employees as it is a benefit to
shareholders concerned with the future market value of traded firms.xviii
For German firms, however, operating in the US or in global markets overlapping
with Anglo-American firms, stock options have been seen as a vital missing ingredient in

their management strategies. Whether true or not, stock options are believed to enhance
flexibility with respect to market competition and market opportunities, enable greater control
over the legions of corporate bureaucrats, and reward risk-taking, notwithstanding
widespread social apprehension about the possible costs of risk-taking.xix But, of course,
management incentives via stock options are only possible if there is a market for corporate
control for German firms. And a market for corporate control is only possible if external
investors are confident in the value of their investment strategies relative to the traditional
claims for privilege made by internal stakeholders (management, labour, and banks).
Inevitably, creating a vibrant German market for corporate control requires reporting systems
recognised by international investors (hence the importance of International Accounting
Standards). And, most importantly, a market for corporate control is only possible if current
domestic investors are able to radically reduce their current holdings without incurring
significant penalties.
It can be argued, then, that large German firms (their management and principal
shareholders) have sought to put in place the institutions and policies necessary to take
advantage of an emerging European market for corporate control. As a result of greater
financial transparency and accountability, inherited systems of employer-sponsored pensions
and retirement income are now essential elements in managing market value. Inevitably, the
costs of funding pension liabilities will have to be accounted for and shared between various
stakeholders: by workers (in the form of lower relative wages), shareholders (in the form of
lower dividends), and perhaps management (in the form of lower shared income). At the
same time, the extent to which management is able to develop liability management strategies
aimed at protecting the long-term value of the firm, they may also be able to protect their
long-term wealth. To do so, however, requires transforming the funding and investment
management of German corporate pension assets and liabilities.

Models of Investment Management
We are now in the position to be able to assess the management of pension assets and
liabilities within large German corporations. Having set out the basic assumptions and
organising principles underpinning the German model (along the lines suggested by
Wolfgang Streeck 1997, amongst others), and having detailed the recent experience of
German firms with Anglo-American systems of investment management we can draw
contrasts between competing modes of organisation. In this section, we will also use the

argument made in the previous section about the increasing significance of managing the
market value of firm.

In fact, we want to show here how changes in the motives of

management may ultimately affect the investment management process.xx

Model A: consensus seeking (satisficing)
In the basic model of the German firm, assumptions were made about the behaviour,
motivation, and relationships between management and labour, and management and
shareholders. Let us assume that whatever the experience and knowledge of corporate
management, we operate in a world so described. Thus we assume that management and
labour are joined together in systems of governance, and have as a common goal maintenance
of their expected long run income. We also assume, like many other writers on the German
model, that the costs of such collaboration (if any) are borne by shareholders in the form of
lower dividends. Of course, there are probably two types of shareholders. One type may have
preferential status (being an internal principal) while the other type has less status (being
denied the benefits of internal knowledge); consequently the costs of such an income
distribution policy may weigh more heavily on one type (the latter) than the other (the
former).
In the first instance, we consider investment management in relation to
pensionskassen assets and liabilities. Here, we can characterise the investment management
process as one of consensus seeking (satisficing) rather than optimising or maximising. Why?
For a variety of reasons. It should be readily appreciated that the co-determination process
dominates the board appointment process, the decision-making process, and the allocation of
risk and uncertainty between those represented on the board of management. Representation
on such boards is more often than not a function of institutional career than it is a function of
expertise and/or knowledge. Being concerned to maintain expected long-term income,
management and labour representatives are highly risk adverse in circumstances where their
decisions may affect constituents’ share of current and expected corporate income. In
particular, worker representatives are assumed very resistant to any changes in their
members’ contributions (if any) to occupational pensions. In these circumstances, it is
widely believed that consensus seeking results in decisions that complement board members’
relationships in related organisations (the firm, the union, the region, the industry etc).
In effect, board members are focused upon a negative goal (minimising risk) rather
than a positive goal. Having protected against any downside risk, the various interests and

relationships present on the pensionskassen drive decision-making recognising that the costs
of poor decisions are more likely than not to be borne by shareholders. There are significant
moral hazard problems in such systems of decision-making, being even more significant in
multi-employer industry pensionskassen. March (1994) suggested that in these types of
circumstances there are many possible outcomes because there are so many different interests
competing for attention. Satisficing is the result of consensus seeking; it is a means of
balancing heterogeneous interests and relationships.

Model B: optimising (within constraints)
Notice that satisficing is, in effect, the default model of decision-making. To get to that point,
all we need do is assume a jumble of competing interests largely unorganised or confused by
virtue of the background pattern of relationships. There are no doubt firms and industries so
easily characterised. In many respects, these are expensive institutions in terms of the costs
of decision-making, often poorly managed and poorly focused upon the management of
pension assets and liabilities. Whereas some would argue that consensus seeking results in
common commitment (Streeck 1997), there does not seem to be any clear reason why this
should be necessarily the case. Here, however, we wish to emphasise that optimising (within
constraints) is the more likely model of decision-making because government regulations
concerning private insurance arrangements loom large in management practice. In fact, it is
probably easier to understand decision-making in large German firms and their
pensionskassen as a problem of decision-making by rules rather than imagining that decisionmaking is as unencumbered (as implied by the satisficing model).
As pensionskassen are governed and monitored by the insurance regulator, these
institutions operate within well-defined boundaries. Not only are there regulations concerning
liabilities, for many years, limits have been imposed on the allocation of assets to traded
equities, government bonds, and the like. These quantitative limits on asset allocation have
effectively narrowed the scope of investment strategy.xxi As well, given the importance of
actuarial expertise relative to the decision-making process, professional standards are deemed
by many to be as important as official regulations. In this context, board members can be
thought to act so as to optimise a complex objective function made up of separate goals and
objectives related to assets and liabilities. By contrast, unfunded direktzusagen plans are not
so burdened by regulations nor are they so exposed to the close scrutiny of external
professionals. Indeed, there appear to be few limits on the allocation of direktzusagen assets.

Rather there is considerable discretion available to firms’ treasurers in driving the rate of
return on invested assets. Of course, the problem is that most firms’ direktzusagen pension
assets are co-mingled with corporate assets.
Interestingly, most writers on the theory of decision making distinguish only between
satisficing and maximising behaviour. If optimisation is addressed it is seen as a mode of
maximising behaviour. In the German case at least, optimisation is a mode of decisionmaking which fits between these two options; it is a form of decision-making that is based
upon the observance of external rules and articulated limits.xxii Can management boards
maximise within constraints? Would they want to do so given the immediate set of
relationships that overlap with and affect board decision-making? It is difficult to answer
these two questions in any conclusive manner. Answers to these questions depend upon the
circumstances of individual firms and industries. For some firms that have cultivated close
relationships with their workers and union representatives, maximising within constraints
may be possible; in play may be the joint commitment of management and workers to the
financial integrity of the firm rather than their fealty to so-called external relationships.
In this situation, it is important to have advice and experience from outside of the
immediate environment. Hence, the experience of the firm in the Anglo-American world can
be an important reference point in setting guidelines for decision making. Likewise, the
advice of investment consultants separate from the close-knit community of German banking
and actuarial consultants may help establish new options and possible relationships.

Model C: maximizing (as if the firm is a global corporation)
For many German firms, caught within the web of regulations and professional practice,
optimising (within constraints) best describes the leading edge of German investment
management. By contrast, the maximising model assumes an unfettered decision-making
process, and presumes the existence of a clear, unambiguous objective: the highest rate of
return on invested assets. Here, as we have seen, the reference point is Anglo-American
practice, recognising that over the past decade this model has provided plan sponsors many
benefits including contribution holidays, supplements to corporate income, and (presumably)
dampened market price volatility. Even so, we should not exaggerate the scope of such a
model; there remain important constraints in any such management regime. The relative
maturity of defined benefit plans can have significant consequences for the allocation of
assets between asset classes. Likewise government regulations relating to minimum funding

requirements can affect investment decision making. Nevertheless, over the 1990s it is
apparent that those Anglo-American firms that based their investment regime on Model C
benefited enormously from the explosive growth of global equity markets.
It is arguable that even if pensionskassen plans have been restricted to optimising or
satisficing, direktzusagen plans have had the opportunity to match and mimic AngloAmerican maximisation strategies. Yet it appears that this option has been rarely taken.
Until recently, it would seem that direktzusagen assets have been deployed to promote the
growth of the firm in ways consistent with the long-term income objectives (growth and
stability) of managers and workers.

As well, it seems that fixed capital (new plant,

technology and infrastructure) has been the ultimate destination for direktzusagen assets.
Advanced financial products found in global capital markets have not been favoured
investments. Only recently, as many German firms have come to realise that higher rates of
return may be found outside the firm and outside of Germany, or in human capital as opposed
to physical capital stock, have senior corporate managers come to appreciate the value of
alternative options. Indeed, it could be observed that as corporate management have shifted
their focus towards the market value of the firm rather than the flow of income, direktzusagen
assets have become more valuable just at a time when global financial markets are
increasingly aware of the unfunded nature of direktzusagen obligations.
Faced with the heterogeneous interests represented on pensionskassen boards it would
seem that direktzusagen plans have greater potential value than pensionskassen plans if
funding could be resolved in accordance with the expectations of global financial markets. In
effect, this would mean segregating direktzusagen assets and liabilities from corporate assets
and liabilities to become an identifiable internal investment organisation. There is evidence
that some larger German firms have established these kinds of organisations, being formal
mechanisms of managing the entire volume of pension assets and liabilities in accordance
with the financial interests of managers and shareholders. Inevitably, to join together these
interests with those of workers into a dedicated internal investment institution requires
considerable political tact; implicitly, worker representatives are required to support the
interests of the firm as it reaches out to the global economy. A subtle shift in loyalty is
required, moving from the system of collective bargaining and industrial co-determination
and the system of social insurance and welfare to the core objectives of the firm (its managers
and shareholders). One possible reward for such a shift in loyalty is enhanced pension and
retirement benefits.

This strategy would re-define the constituency of workers’ representatives. At the
same time, as the European Commission moves towards an accounting standards regime
modelled on the IASC, and as it moves towards European capital market integration by
dismantling country-specific quantitative limits on assets classes and cross-border
investments, the conditions for a maximisation model are being put in place.

Indeed,

notwithstanding the debate over various EC proposals to implement a common set of
prudential standards and investment guidelines (as developed in De Ryck 1999), it seems
increasingly clear that Model C has strong advocates amongst the larger German firms. The
introduction of the Euro has made these types of pan-European regulations more important
than ever before. If the market value of the firm is to be the most important management
target, Model C is a necessary institutional reform: the market value of the firm can only be
maximised if the value of pension assets in relation to liabilities is also maximised.
In these ways, the “up-scaling” of the German economic environment has begun to
under-cut the interests of large German firms’ management and workers in domestic
industrial relations systems. Institutions like employer-sponsored pension and retirement
plans once believed to be irrelevant to German social systems have come to the very centre of
corporate decision making. Model C and the funding of pension liabilities are now at the
core of the relationship between management and workers.

If Model C does come to

dominate, at the limit German workers may be best thought of as corporate debt (bond)
holders on par with corporate (equity) shareholders. In that case, management and workers
will be joined together in a very different regime of interests and incentives than those that
are commonly used to describe German stakeholder capitalism (compare Hutton 1995).

Conclusions
In this paper, we have focused upon the causes of changing German corporate pension
management policies. Recall, in a previous paper we were able to explain much of the history
and recent development of pension liability reporting standards. But we were not able to
fully account for the apparent shift in German corporate pension policy (Clark, Mansfield,
and Tickell 2000). This is an important issue, reflecting common debate in comparative
corporate governance and economic geography.

It is widely assumed that nation-state

institutions and traditions tend to persist in the face of economic institutions located in other
jurisdictions. This is not necessarily an absolute argument; many analysts would suggest that
any tendency of persistence must be balanced against the forces of competition (Bebchuk and

Roe 1998). Lock-in does not, and can not, persist forever (Leibowitz and Margolis 1995).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to account for instances of rapid institutional change when so
much of the literature and national political debate is hostile to the imperatives driving
globalisation. Given the paralysis in German public policy concerning the under-funding of
social insurance liabilities it may seem surprising that, in the corporate arena at least, there
have been such changes in management practice.
Our account of German corporate pension policy has focused upon the motives of
corporate management in relation to workers and shareholders. We noted in the previous
paper the competitive advantages of access to global financial markets. In this paper, we
moved to consider the significance of management interests in remuneration policies that are
increasingly focused upon the market value of the firm. To do so, we suggested that large
German firms operating in the Anglo-Saxon world during the 1990s learnt a great deal about
advanced financial management; specifically, they learnt the value of maximisation
strategies. In order to make this point, we emphasized competing corporate and pension
investment management practices differentiating between three models: maximisation,
optimisation, and satisficing. For German corporate management, knowledgeable about the
costs and benefits of competing investment management practices, one lesson of the 1990s
was that the satisficing model is a most expensive option whether pension liabilities are
funded, unfunded or under-funded. In an integrated global financial market with common
accounting rules, the implications of pension liabilities for corporate market value are all too
clear.
To sustain our argument, we emphasized management motives. In particular, it was
argued that the historical agreement between management and labour to share corporate
revenue within and without the firm is slowly breaking down. Corporate management has
less of an interest in sharing current and expected income with labour than it has an
increasing interest in generating their own wealth in the form of stock options linked to the
market value of the firm as determined in global financial markets. This is a very different
model of corporate governance than that which dominated, and still dominates in many
sectors and small and medium firms, German political economy for more than fifty years (see
also Pistor 1999).
We must be careful, however, not to exaggerate our argument. We do not mean to
suggest that stock options are the most important issue in German corporate governance.
There remain important political barriers to the full implementation of such systems of

executive compensation. The current coalition government has found it difficult to introduce
the necessary reforms of social insurance and the necessary revisions of the tax code that
would either promote private employer-sponsored pensions or the trading of corporate stock.
In this context, any widespread introduction of stock options would presuppose political
agreement on many issues still outstanding in the public arena. On the other hand, it seems to
us that the prospect of some form of executive compensation based on the market value of the
firm now drives the management of large German firms. Inevitably, in this context, pension
liabilities have become an important part of management corporate strategy. Given the
experience in the Anglo-American world, the funding and management of inherited pension
obligations is an essential ingredient in any plans aimed at maximising the market value of
the firm.
There maybe, of course, other motives important in understanding recent corporate
pension initiatives. We have surely only touched the surface of a complex issue. Witness
recent studies on hostile take-overs in Germany (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 1999) and the
dissembling of the German model (Berndt 1998). Even so, in the previous paper we were
unable to sustain a link between the adoption of international accounting standards and
German corporate governance in circumstances unrelated to the development of those
standards. Here, we have argued that the adoption of international accounting standards
given significant corporate pension liabilities can be traced back to a basic issue deeply
embedded in German political economy: the changing relationship between management,
workers, and shareholders. We have suggested that this relationship is being rewritten within
large firms, even if debate over the proper form of this relationship has been stymied in the
public arena. It is as if large firms have been made exceptional--as if German national interest
in global economic champions has necessitated their leaving the complex array of interrelated national social systems for the global market place.
Here, then, are two important implications for the future of employer-sponsored
private pensions in Germany. If large German firms are to be allowed to float free of the core
systems underpinning German social structure, mimicking and matching their AngloAmerican competitors, questions must be raised about the long-term future of defined benefit
pensions. As they move into the world of financial accountability and transparency, the
funding and management of inherited pension liabilities loom large as issues likely to
distinguish German firms from Anglo-American firms. In the US context, and increasingly in
the UK and elsewhere, employer-sponsored defined benefit plans are slowly giving way to

defined contribution plans and other more exotic individual retirement accounts. In this
respect, once German firms are able to institute management regimes to discount the value of
inherited liabilities, what would be the limits of any corporate policy designed to shift
pension risk and liability to employees? At issue, is the extent to which workers' interest in
expected long-term income can be transformed into a share of short-term corporate wealth.
One should not underestimate German workers’ risk aversion; this is deeply
embedded in the relations between management and labour as well as in the political arena. It
is apparent, however, that at a moment in time when there is considerable debate about the
possible means of funding retirement the recent experience of large German corporations
provides important lessons for German political economy. If international accounting
standards are to be applied to all traded European firms then the implied burden of any policy
designed to encourage the provision of employer-sponsored pensions may have to be shared
between the social partners. Otherwise, whatever the tax incentives introduced to encourage
private provision, it seems unlikely that German employers would readily embrace a model
of pension provision which carries with it a liability risk fully exposed to the market of
corporate control. Perhaps there are alternatives, including industry-wide systems of
mandatory pension provision like the Dutch model. Such a system would naturally map onto
existing systems of labour management and corporate governance. As we have seen,
however, such systems carry with them significant risks of moral hazard.
In the end, the implication of our research on German employer-sponsored pensions is
that any private alternative to the existing system of social insurance must be a funded system
of private provision. Existing unfunded direktzusagen (book reserve) and under-funded
pensionskassen (mutual insurance) defined benefit systems will not survive the harsh gaze of
globalisation. In that case, one of the most important pillars underpinning the financial
structure of the German model will have been rendered obsolete. The question that remains is
the extent to which such a profound change in corporate financial structure will affect labourmanagement relationships and German society in general.
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Table 1

German employer-sponsored occupational pensions percentage
share of total retirement income (1996) assuming 35 years of service
Employer
Contributions

Employee
Contributions

Total
(%)

BASF

24

4

28

Bayer

25

3

28

Bosch

26

-

26

Daimler Benz

30

-

30

Degussa

25

3

28

Henkel

33

-

33

Hoechst

27

4

31

Merck

35

-

35

Siemens

27

-

27

Firm

Note:Assuming a defined benefit pension without regard to the particular
institution managing pension plan assets and liabilities

Table 2

US pension and related income plan experience of German Dax-listed
corporations
1997-1999, excluding death, disability, health and dental care plans

Firm

No. of

Plans
Adidas
Allianz
BASF
Bayer
Bayerische Hypound-Vereinsbank
BMW
Commerzbank
Daimler
Daimler/Chrysler
Degussa
Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Telecom
Dresdner Bank
Fresenius
Henkel Corp
Linde Ent.
Lufthansa
Mannesmann
Preussag
RWE
Schering Corp
Siemens
Thyssen
Krupp
Volkswagen

4
2
5
14
1
25
7
1
10
3
3
2
6
1
17
9
5
10
2
1
5
46
14
2
11

Pension and Retirement Plans
DB

√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Union

Defined Contribution
401(K)
√
√
√
√
√

Profit

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√

√

Savings
√

Flexible
√

Acquired
Firms
√

√
√
√

√

u
u

√
√

√
√

u

√
√
√

√
√

u

√
√

√

u
√

√
√
√

√

√

√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√

√
√

√
u

√
√

U
U

√

u
u

√
√
√
√
√

Source: freeERISA.com
Notes: For definitions of these various different types of pension and retirement income plans see the web site
www.freeERISA.com/info/glossary.asp Notice there are many different versions of defined contribution plans.
For example, flexible benefit plans sometimes called cafeteria plans rely upon an IRS tax provision, and may or
may not supplement other benefits. A savings plan is a type that defined contribution plans in which participants
may make discretionary contributions either matched or partially matched by their employers. Normally such
contributions are made after tax rather than before tax (the preferred basis of pension fund contributions).

Table 3 Summary of Bayer Corp. employer-sponsored US pension plans (1997)

Plan
No.

Plan
Type

003*

DB

Participants
Vested
NonRetirees**
Vested
216
120
118

006*

DB

009*

Year end ($ml)
Assets Expenses

Year-end
Investment
Return (%)

Net ($ml)
Income

PBGC
Covered

7.27

0.23

31.4

1.39

√

Fewer than 100 participants

0.97

0.014

15.3

0.22

√

DB

Fewer than 100 participants

1.13

0.006

19.3

0.26

√

010*

DB

231

176

102

13.67

0.241

16.3

2.15

√

015

DB

121

7

60

2.39

0.039

51.8

0.48

√

019

401(k)

14,541

4,175

12,696

1,946

44.37

19.1

286.51

√

021

401(k)

588

66

242

73.29

2.15

18.0

17.79

√

023

N/A

025

401(k)

384

55

6

7.77

0.411

N/A

3.05

√

Source: freeERISA.com
Notes: *Union identified as representing covered workers.
**Including separated employees with deferred entitlements.

i

/. Throughout this paper, we use these three terms to represent agents’ economic behaviour (in

general) and the behaviour of management, labour and shareholders in particular. In latter sections,
close attention is paid to their definitions and distinctions. For the moment, it is sufficient to suppose
that maximisation refers to seeking the best possible outcome notwithstanding the existence of known
cognitive and organisational barriers to achieving that outcome. Optimisation can be thought to refer
to choosing the best option for achieving the most desired result consistent with known constraints.
By contrast, satisficing may be thought to refer to decision making that has as its goal a satisfactory
outcome if not the best outcome or the optimal result. Here, we use a set of distinctions first
introduced by Simon (1956) and refined further to identify a gap between maximisation and
optimisation.
ii

/. Whereas it might have been suggested some years ago that fieldwork was the exclusive domain of

economic geographers, mainstream economists have come to realise the special insights and
knowledge that can come from this kind of analysis. See Helper’s (2000) paper, and the results of the
joint NBER/Sloan sponsored project on industrial technology and productivity using “site based
research”. Martin Feldstein (2000) President of the NBER provides a helpful overview to the project
and the value of what he terms as “pin factory” visits (referencing Adam Smith).

iii

/. Industry and academic commentaries have also focused upon the economic costs of social

insurance for industrial competitiveness (Steinmeyer 1996), and the long-term unsustainable financial
burdens of the current Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system (see Borsch-Supan 2000a). Some analysts
have suggested radical reform of social insurance, including the introduction of notional accounts,
partial funding and capped benefits (Borsch-Supan 2000b). There are also those that advocate the
promotion of tax-preferred employer-sponsored occupational pensions, matching and mimicking the
claimed desirable attributes of Anglo-American defined contribution pension plans (Deutsche Bank
1996).
iv

/. This point is made by numerous authors. See, for example, Wolfgang Streeck (1997, p. 37) where

he suggests that firms "are social institutions, not just networks of private contracts or the property of
the shareholders. Their internal order is a matter of public interest and are subject to extensive social
regulation, by law and industrial agreement. Also, managers of large German firms face capital and
labour markets that are highly organised, enabling both capital and labour to participate directly in the
everyday operation of the firm and requiring decisions to be continuously negotiated."
v

/. The idea that such coverage rates are too low or too narrowly focused on particular segments of

German industry is surely a reflection of the more general claim on behalf of the comprehensive
nature of social insurance. These coverage rates are not so unusual or limited if compared to the
Anglo-American world. See Clark (2000) on UK and US coverage rates, noting the bias towards
large firms, unionised industry, and manufacturing.
vi

/. We do not wish to over-emphasise the significance of corporate private pensions. There are good

reasons why much of the literature focuses upon the German public pension system - as many studies
show, statutory pension insurance dominates the provision of retirement income (measured according
to the value of benefits). On the other hand, there is considerable interest in the current role of
employer-sponsored pensions and in their possible long-term role in providing benefits if statutory
pension insurance may be unable to play the same role as in the past. For further detailed analysis of
the German pension system and a proposal to introduce a mandatory savings system see the recent
paper by Rurup (2000). On the relationship between public and private pension provision in Germany
see Schmahl (1997).
vii

/. Surely these are not controversial assumptions, at least in economic geography (Clark 1994). In

economics, however, such assumptions cut against the possibility of creating universal axioms
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. While recognising that there may well be instances of

behaviour that reflect the immediate context in which action takes place, many economic theorists are
loath to recognise that context may have a systematic effect. For a detailed analysis of this point in the
context of the performance of financial markets see Shleifer (2000) on behavioural finance.
viii

/. There are various explanations of these arrangements, many of which emphasize the deliberate

fragmentation of union and management powers characteristic of post war Germany (see O’Sullivan
1998).
ix

/. See, for example, Edwards and Mayer (1998) on the dimensions of cross-holdings of shares in

Germany.
x

/. Assumptions five and six may be disputed by some readers. Furthermore, the concentration of

much of the academic literature on the formal powers of supervisory boards may reinforce, for some
readers, a sense of unease about the presumed scope of powers attributed to German corporate
management (see Weiss 1995). We recognise that our emphasis on management as opposed to
supervisory boards will be controversial. Even so, we take heart from recent research on German
corporate governance. Pistor’s (1999) paper is similarly more focused on the effective powers of
management in circumstances where global competition has given management the opportunity to remake their relationships with both workers and shareholders.
xi

/. In this vein, Reynaud (2000, 8) suggested that the value of international comparisons was ''not to

import ready-made solutions from abroard to solve problems faced at (the) domestic level.'' Going
further, he said ''national pension systems are the product of the societies concerned and inevitably
reflect the series of specific characteristics, especially concerning the relationship between the state
and society, political traditions, industrial relations, structure of the economy, and perceptions of
justice and equality.”
xii

/. This data is made available on a free web-site where US pension and retirement income benefit

information based on Form 5500. That web-site utilises official government information but is not
affiliated directly or indirectly with the US government. The web address is freeERISA.com
xiii

/. See also a report by industry analysts Towers Perrin (2000). They show that in 1999 the reported

earnings of 25 of the 30 firms included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index were positively affected by
pension income (including reductions in pension contributions) derived from defined benefit
programmes. As well, reported pension liabilities were smaller because these same firms were able to

increase their discount rates (used to determine the present value of obligations). The 1999 effect of
DB pension plans was stronger than even the 1998 effect on net corporate income.
xiv

/. We should also recognise that German firms most affected by this issue have been those that have

acquired or have established Anglo-American firms staffed by UK or US nationals. The problem for
such firms has been to attract and retain the best staff when, in fact, German firms have been resistant
to the introduction of stock options as part of senior managers' compensation packages. Worse still
have been instances when German firms have introduced stock-options for UK or US nationals but
have restricted access to such compensation to their German staff. The internal tensions occasioned by
such inequities between senior managers have made the management process across systems of
corporate governance and financial markets even more difficult than heretofore recognised in the
literature (compare Hopt et al. 1998).
xv

/. It should be noted, however, that although managerial stock ownership has increased in recent

years, it remains true that many other forms of executive compensation are used to regulate the
principal-agent relationship. See the study by Holderness et al. (1999) on trends in managerial
ownership of US corporations since the Great Depression of the twentieth-century.
xvi

/. Still, we should take care not to over-emphasise the significance of stock-options in the US

economy. The fact that it is important in Silicon Valley does not mean that it is widely used in other
sectors and regions of the US economy. Witness, for example, the comment made by Paul Osterman
(1999, p. 15) that "Silicon Valley is a white collar craft labour market in which very skilled workers
move easily from place to place aided not by crafty unions but by informal networks. The useful
lesson to draw from the valley is that in a labour market characterised by job turnover highly skilled
people whose capacities are in short supply will do fine.... Just as no one believes that the labour
market for sports stars or Hollywood actors typifies the circumstances of most Americans, nor should
we believe that the success of one stratum in the Silicon Valley presages success for everyone.''
xvii

/. Actually, the question of executive compensation is far more complicated than these brief

comments may suggest. Recent research suggests that performance related compensation is, more
often than not, less about relative performance (comparing corporations’ performance) and more
about individual firm performance or industry performance. Industry competition, corporate strategy,
and inter-firm interaction all complicate any assumption that relative firm performance is the obvious
benchmark against which to assess management competence (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999). In other
words, stock options may be seen as an issue of wealth allocation between competing stakeholders in
the modern firm.

xviii

/. For details of the FASB standard accounting for stock based compensation see their October

1995 (154-C) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123. In that publication the Board
recommends rather than requires that firms report stock based employee compensation using a fair
value method. It is suggested that this method is preferable to previous methods in that employee
compensation would be measured ''at the grant date based on the value of the award... recognised over
the service period". The FASB goes into some detail about the controversy surrounding their proposal
and the compromise forced upon it by Congress. It remains a highly contentious issue, witness the
controversy surrounding a very similar proposal by the UK Accounting Standards Board (July 2000).
In the end, it seems that this issue may have to be resolved at the International Accounting Standards
Committee.
xix

/. Further more, it might also be suggested that German management anticipate the flow-on from the

US and the UK of the technological benefits for labour productivity associated with the “new
economy”. See the recent report by Williams and Reid (2000) on the consequences of the “new
economy” for Europe.
xx

/. There will be aspects of this discussion unfamiliar to an Anglo-American audience. In previous

work, Clark (2000) set out the structure of the Anglo-American investment management industry and
the market for financial services. The Anglo-American pension fund industry relies heavily upon the
market for services typically internal to German firms and their banking partners. Whereas investment
officers and pension fund trustees are responsible for discriminating amongst competing service
providers, these kinds of decisions are rarely made in German firms and their pensionskassen.
xxi

/. Details on the nature of these regulations for German investment policy are to be found in

Heubeck and Baum (1998). Their article is devoted to (then) recent proposals for a new “concept for
occupational pension financing”, combining aspects of the Anglo-American world (including the UK
and the US) with solvency protection and independence from plan sponsors. As is well appreciated,
these types of proposals have come at an increasing rate over the past few years, being aimed at
Germany, other continental European countries and the pan-European environment.
xxii

/. It might be argued, of course, that Anglo-American pension fund trustees are similarly obsessed

with rules. If that is the case, as suggested in part in Clark (2000), then it should be understood that
rules as constraints more often than not dominate German institutions.

